INTRODUCTION

DNA
1 solved the case of a seventy-eight year old grandmother, who was raped and strangled to death in her home. 2 Ten years after her death, a match in the state's DNA databank revealed that the grandmother's assailant was Millous Temple, who was serving time in prison for molesting two of his grandchildren. 3 Temple's DNA matched the DNA collected from the grandmother's crime scene, resulting in a "cold hit." 4 In a different case, DNA exonerated Clyde Charles from a rape conviction after he spent over a decade in prison pleading his innocence.
5 DNA has become a powerful tool in solving crimes and exonerating the innocent. The Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS") has produced approximately 5,000 cold hits nationwide by matching offender profiles with samples from unsolved crimes. 6 A recent study showed that over one hundred rapes could have been prevented if every state had started collecting DNA in 1990. 7 This note discusses the growing debate over which analytical
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[Vol. 8:185 approach the courts should apply when addressing the constitutionality of DNA collection statutes. Currently, every court in the United States deciding whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the collection of DNA samples from qualifying convicted felons for entry in state and federal DNA indexing systems has found that the collection does not violate the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable search and seizure. 8 However, these courts are split on which analytical method to apply in upholding these statutory DNA searches. 9 This note will examine the United States v. Kincade 10 decision as well as other recent decisions that take alternative approaches to resolving whether the DNA statutes violate the Fourth Amendment.
11
On rehearing en banc in United States v. Kincade, the court reversed an earlier decision of the panel, 12 and found that the collection of DNA samples from qualifying convicted felons pursuant to the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 ("DNA Act") . 9 See id. 10 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) . 11 There are two basic analyses that the courts have adopted in deciding this issue: the basic Fourth Amendment reasonableness test, which examines the totality of the circumstances (see infra Part III) and the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, which inquires whether there is a special need beyond the ordinary law enforcement purpose (see infra Part IV ing or "profiling" has become such a powerful tool in solving crimes. 25 When police evidence technicians canvass a crime scene, they search for a suspect's blood, saliva, semen, hair, and skin cells, which are all sources of DNA that may link a perpetrator to a crime. 26 After the samples are collected, scientists extract the DNA at a lab to determine the DNA profile and to see if there is a match from a known suspect. If no known suspect's profile is identified, the sample can then be transmitted to state and national databanks for comparisons.
27
The DNA Act provides that "[t]he probation office responsible for the supervision under the Federal law of an individual on probation, parole, or supervised release shall collect a DNA sample from each such individual who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying federal offense or a qualifying military offense."
28 Qualifying federal offenses include homicides, sexual offenses, kidnapping, robbery, and burglary, as well as conspiracy to commit any of these offenses. 29 Failure of an individual to cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample is a misdemeanor offense 30 and the supervising probation office is authorized to restrain or detain, if necessary, any individual who refuses to cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample. 31 Additionally, the Act requires:
[ 
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claimed that it was a suspicionless search violative of his Fourth Amendment rights. 41 In reviewing this same issue, several courts have upheld the constitutionality of the DNA collection statutes under the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 42 However, other courts have upheld these statutes by applying a pure Fourth Amendment totality of the circumstances test. 43 While not rejecting the special needs analysis, the court in Kincade relied on its precedent, Rise v. Oregon, 44 and applied the traditional Fourth Amendment totality of the circumstances test. 45 In upholding the Oregon DNA collection statute, the court in Rise had followed the totality of the circumstances approach used in United States v. Knights, 46 which based its decision on the following factors: the reduced expectation of privacy, the degree of intrusion, and the likelihood of advancing the public interest.
47
In a concurring opinion, Judge Gould affirmed the majority's opinion but believed the court should have applied the special needs analysis rather than the totality of the circumstances test. 48 Noting the stronger precedent under the special needs theory, Judge Gould suggested that the Supreme Court would uphold the compulsory collection of DNA samples under the special needs 41 Id. at 821. 42 See, e.g., Green v doctrine. 49 The deterrent effect of the DNA program would serve "the special needs of a supervised release system" with the goal of preventing future crimes. 50 Moreover, Judge Gould opined that "any use of the CODIS database to solve past crimes is incidental to the special and forward-looking penalogical need that justifies the program." 51 Five judges dissented in Kincade, 52 addressing their concern for "the dangers inherent in allowing the government to collect and store information about its citizens in a centralized place." 53 The strong dissent criticized the plurality's totality of the circumstances approach, as well as the special needs doctrine favored by the concurring judge, in upholding the constitutionality of the DNA Act. 54 The dissent warned that upholding the DNA Act under either of these two Fourth Amendment analyses, especially the totality of the circumstances test, threatened the traditional safeguards of the Fourth Amendment, which is designed to protect citizens against arbitrary and invasive government actions.
III: TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH: THE TRADITIONAL FOURTH AMENDMENT BALANCING TEST
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is always "reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." 56 An essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect and safeguard the privacy interests of individuals who are subject to searches and seizures against arbitrary government intrusions. 57 63 Id. at 830. However, it is important to note that Knights did not involve a suspicionless search of a probationer. The officer's search in Knights was supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 829. As courts have only upheld suspicionless searches under the special needs doctrine where a program serves a non-law enforcement purpose, the dissent in Kincade criticized the plurality's totality of the circumstances approach, arguing it completely dodged the Fourth Amendment's suspicion requirement. Id. at 860 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
vising conditional releasees, is in turn sufficient to sustain suspicionless searches of his person and property even in the absence of some non-law enforcement "special need" -at least where such searches meet the Fourth Amendment touchstone of reasonableness as gauged by the totality of the circumstances.
64
Only in limited circumstances, when there is a non-law enforcement special need, has the court upheld suspicionless searches. 74 The pregnant women subjected to drug testing in Ferguson 75 and the motorists stopped at drug checkpoints in Edmond were free citizens 76 who enjoyed a greater expectation of privacy than Kincade, a convicted felon on parole. 77 Because convicted felons do not enjoy the same privacy rights as free citizens, searches that involve minimal intrusions and which are based upon legitimate governmental interests will survive Fourth Amendment implications.
Level of Intrusion
The Supreme Court has upheld suspicionless searches that intrude upon an individual's bodily integrity when they are reasonable searches requiring minimal intrusion. 78 Kincade, a parolee, was required to submit a blood sample for entry into CODIS, the federal DNA database, pursuant to the DNA Act. 79 Citing Schmerber v. California, 80 the court stressed that blood testing has become routine and commonplace in our everyday life, therefore amounting to only a minimal intrusion of the body.
81
Other courts have also recently found that the bodily intrusion of taking a blood or saliva sample results in only a minor intru- 656 (1989) , the Court held that urine samples were reasonable searches. However, it is important to note that both of these cases involved non-law enforcement suspicionless searches upheld under the special needs doctrine. 79 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 820-21. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a(a) (West 2004) which specifies the procedure for collecting DNA samples, but does not specify the type of DNA sample required. However, § 14135(a)(c)(1) defines the term "DNA sample" as "a tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample of an individual on which a DNA analysis can be carried out." There is no requirement that the sample must be a blood extraction. 80 384 U.S. 757 (1966) . The Schmerber opinion notes that the quantity of blood taken is minimal and for the majority of individuals "the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain." Id. at 771. 81 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 836-37.
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sion. 82 Buccal swabbing has gained recent popularity over blood tests because it requires much less intrusion than taking a blood sample. 83 A buccal swab is taken by gently swabbing the inside of the cheek to collect epithelial cells, 84 which is a nonintrusive and painless procedure. 85 
Governmental Interest
Courts addressing the constitutionality of statutes which require the collection of DNA samples from qualifying convicted felons have offered several governmental interests for permitting these suspicionless searches: the government's "special need" to fill the CODIS system with DNA samples from qualifying convicted felons, 86 have held that these legitimate governmental interests of the DNA Act outweigh the minimal intrusion of taking a DNA sample on a parolee's reduced privacy interests. 89 The court in Kincade, citing Rise, held that once a person is convicted of a qualifying offense under the DNA Act, his/her identity becomes a matter of state interest. 90 The court further stressed that the searches authorized under the DNA Act serve society's "overwhelming interest" in deterring future crime and reducing recidivism. The strong dissent in Kincade argued that under the totality of the circumstances test applied by the plurality, all Americans who have a reduced expectation of privacy would be susceptible to compulsory DNA extractions for entry into a DNA databank. 92 The dissent's primary concern with the totality of the circumstances analysis is that the Fourth Amendment's requirement of suspicion is completely ignored. 93 The overriding principle of the Fourth Amendment requires a government official to have some quantum of individualized suspicion to search an individual in order to obtain evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. 94 The dissent in Kincade stressed the danger of the plurality's willingness to uphold a suspicionless law enforcement search under the totality of the circumstances approach: "Under such an approach, all of us would inevitably have our liberty eroded when our privacy interests are balanced against the 'monumental' interests of law enforcement." 95 The premise of the totality of the circumstances test is to guide the high rate of recidivism among sexual offenders and DNA's usefulness in solving crimes); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that the government has a legitimate interest in investigating and prosecuting crimes). 89 . 1995) ). 91 Id. at 838-39. 92 Id. at 844. The dissent offers a list of citizens who have a reduced expectation of privacy: "attendees of public high schools or universities, persons seeking to obtain driver's licenses, applicants for federal employment, or persons requiring any form of federal identification, and those who desire to travel by airplane . . . [as well as] citizens in the Armed Forces." Id. 93 Id. at 860-61. The dissent noted the plurality's inability to cite "a single case that has applied the totality of the circumstances test to a regime of suspicionless searches," suggesting that there are none. Id. at 862. 94 Id. at 864. 95 Id.
the courts in determining whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists. When there is reasonable suspicion to conduct a search, the courts balance the intrusion of privacy rights against a legitimate governmental interest. The purpose behind this balancing test is to determine whether the suspicion is constitutionally sufficient to conduct the search. For these reasons, the dissent objected to the use of the balancing test in determining the constitutionality of the DNA Act because no suspicion to search, reasonable or not, ever exists at the time the DNA is collected.
IV: SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE
Currently, the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, along with several other district and state courts, have upheld the constitutionality of state and federal DNA statutes under the special needs doctrine. 96 Although these courts conceded that the collection of DNA constituted a suspicionless search, they concluded that the DNA collection did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it served a non-law enforcement purpose. 
100
Under the special needs doctrine, "searches that would otherwise 96 In determining whether a search qualifies under the special needs exception, the court will first consider the primary purpose of the program. If the primary purpose serves a need beyond the normal need for law enforcement, the court will weigh the governmental interests against the individual's privacy interests to determine whether the government's need for a suspicionless search outweighs the intrusion into an individual's expectation of privacy.
102
A. Primary Purpose under the Special Needs Doctrine
According to the Supreme Court decisions in Edmond and Ferguson, suspicionless searches will not be exempted from ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements if the primary purpose of the program serves general law enforcement needs. 103 In Edmond, the Supreme Court clarified an earlier decision, Michigan Department of State of Police v. Sitz, in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of a highway sobriety checkpoint program. 104 Under this checkpoint program, police officers stopped motorists briefly, without any suspicion, to check for signs of intoxication. 105 In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court found that although the program served a law enforcement need, the immediate objective of promoting highway safety weighed heavily in favor of finding the sobriety checkpoint program constitutional. 106 The Court in Edmond struck down the city's drug interdiction checkpoints finding that the primary purpose did not serve a special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement. 107 The
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Court distinguished this checkpoint from the one upheld in Sitz by reiterating that the primary purpose of the checkpoint program upheld in Sitz was to reduce the "immediate hazard" posed by drunk drivers 108 and that the Court "had never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."
109 Although Sitz clearly involved law enforcement purposes, the Supreme Court noted in Edmond that it had upheld the constitutionality of the checkpoint at issue in that case because the primary objective of the program was to promote highway safety. 110 The Supreme Court distinguished Edmond from Sitz, finding that the checkpoint set up to interdict illegal narcotics served the primary purpose of gathering evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing and therefore required individualized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.
111
The Supreme Court in Ferguson warned that "[t]he extensive entanglement of law enforcement cannot be justified by reference to legitimate needs." 112 The Court held that although drug rehabilitation was the ultimate goal of secretly testing pregnant women for drugs, the program could not be upheld since the immediate objective was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes. 113 The Court's opinions in Edmond and Ferguson made a distinction between a program's primary or immediate purpose and its ultimate objective.
114 "Because law enforcement involvement always serves some broader social purpose or objective, virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose." 115 The Supreme Court's focus on the primary purpose potentially leaves room for a secondary purpose of general crime control. In Edmond, the Court did not decide whether a checkpoint with a primary purpose of checking and verifying licenses and registration with a secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics would 108 Id. at 39. 109 Id. at 41. 110 See id. at 41-42. 111 Id. The Court distinguished the approved checkpoint programs with the program in Edmond and found that since the program in Edmond did not serve the primary purpose of policing the border or ensuring roadway safety, it could not be upheld. Note, however, that all of these programs serve law enforcement purposes; the difference is whether the law enforcement purpose is primary or ancillary. 112 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 n.20. 113 Id. at 82-3. 114 Id. at 84; Edmonds, 531 U.S. at 42. 115 Ferguson, 531 U.S. at 84.
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NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:185 qualify under the special needs doctrine. 116 In applying these Supreme Court decisions, it would appear that if the primary purpose of a program serves general law enforcement needs, it will be struck down; whereas if the law enforcement purpose is ancillary, the program may survive. To determine whether a suspicionless search fits within the special needs doctrine, courts must first identify its primary purpose. Recent decisions in both the state and federal courts within the Second, 118 Third, 119 Fourth, 120 Fifth, 121 Seventh, 122 and Tenth 123 Circuits have held that the "immediate objective" of state and federal DNA statutes is to fill the DNA databanks with DNA samples from qualifying offenders for identification purposes while its "ultimate goal" is to solve past and future crimes. 124 These courts contend that the goal of filling CODIS goes beyond the ordinary purpose of law enforcement and therefore fits within the special needs exception of the Fourth Amendment. The courts' interpretation of the DNA Act's primary purpose is consistent with the Act's legislative history, which contains a congressional finding that "[t]he development of DNA identification technology is one of the most important advances in criminal identification methods
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[Vol. 8:185 some courts have found that although searches under state and federal DNA statutes serve ordinary law enforcement purposes, they nevertheless comport with the Fourth Amendment. 133 Kincade's dissent criticized the application of the special needs doctrine to uphold the DNA Act and instead found that the statute served an ordinary law enforcement purpose, arguing that the Supreme Court has never upheld suspicionless searches in programs that serve a general interest in law enforcement. 134 However, the Supreme Court has found special needs beyond normal law enforcement that justify suspicionless searches, such as the supervision of regulated industries, 135 implementation of border and sobriety checkpoints, 136 supervision of probationers, 137 and the operation of schools 138 and prisons. 139 In these examples,
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crimes. 153 DNA is the most reliable form of identification in our modern time 154 and serves a need beyond ordinary law enforcement. Although the ancillary purposes of the DNA Act may serve ordinary law enforcement needs, particularly investigating and prosecuting crimes, the Supreme Court will likely uphold the DNA collection statutes because their immediate and primary objective is to build a reliable identification system of federally convicted felons through the use of DNA.
B. Fourth Amendment Balancing Test: Totality of the Circumstances
If a court finds that the primary purpose of a search goes beyond the ordinary need for law enforcement, it must next conduct a traditional Fourth Amendment totality of the circumstances balancing test. This test weighs the intrusion on an individual's privacy interest against the government's special need that supported the program. 155 The court must consider whether the government's interest in filling the CODIS system with DNA samples justifies intrusions on the diminished privacy rights of qualifying convicted felons. Courts upholding federal and state DNA statutes using the special needs doctrine have found that the government's need to fill CODIS and obtain reliable and accurate identification of convicted felons coupled with the minimal intrusion of taking a DNA sample outweigh a probationer's diminished privacy rights.
V: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: COLLECT DNA SAMPLES THROUGH BOOKING
The standard police "booking" procedures could be the answer to the debate over the constitutionality of federal and state DNA collection statutes, since these procedures are exempt from the usual requirements of the Fourth Amendment. "[R]easonable
